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THE EFFECT OF BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCE
MODIFICATION PROCEEDINGS: How THE TENTH CIRCUIT
GOT IT RIGHT IN RHODES
INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Rhodes," the Tenth Circuit was tasked with de-
ciding whether sentence modification proceedings would be governed by
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker.2 The Booker
Court held that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional
when binding on federal judges. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Rhodes
determined whether the Guidelines would be binding on federal judges in
sentence modification proceedings-rather than initial sentencings-or
whether judicial discretion to craft lower sentences was authorized.
In Booker, the Supreme Court was silent on how its decision af-
fected sentence modification proceedings. The Ninth Circuit addressed
this unanswered question in 2007, and held that Booker applies to modi-
fication proceedings.4 In Rhodes, the Tenth Circuit broke from the Ninth
and held that Booker does not apply to sentence modification proceed-
ings.5 Thus, according to Rhodes, federal sentencing judges must strictly
adhere to the Guidelines when imposing sentence modifications.
The key to the Rhodes decision is the Tenth Circuit's willingness to
distinguish between original sentencing proceedings and sentence modi-
fication proceedings. Booker applies to original sentencing proceedings,
and therefore, the court differentiated sentence modification proceedings
in order to preserve the mandatory nature of the Guidelines in modifica-
tion actions. The Tenth Circuit distinguished the proceedings on two
bases: (1) separate statutes authorize the respective proceedings; and (2)
the two statutes contain substantively different language.6 Sentence mod-
ification proceedings are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).7 This provi-
sion allows for a sentence to be adjusted if the Sentencing Commission
lowers relevant guidelines.8 Modification is not available to increase an
already imposed sentence.9 Sentence modification is a strictly optional
proceeding, granted at the discretion of the court, which may decrease an
I. 549 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 2008).
2. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
3. See id. at 244.
4. United States v. Hicks, 472 F.3d 1167, 1169 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007).
5. Rhodes, 549 F.3d 833, 840 (10th Cir. 2008).
6. Id. at 840.
7. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (2006).
8. Id. § 3582(c)(2).
9. See id. § 3582(c).
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individual's period of incarceration or probation. 0 The majority of courts
have held that a proceeding under this statute is not a full resentencing of
the defendant.'
Original sentencing proceedings, on the other hand, are governed by
18 U.S.C. § 3553. Amongst other provisions, the statutory language in
§ 3553 sets forth the factors the judge will weigh in making a sentencing
decision.' 3 Based on interpretation of these factors, the judge must im-
pose a sentence that is reasonable given the facts and circumstances of
the conviction. This process is more expansive than the narrower sen-
tence modification proceeding because judges are often called upon to
make additional findings of fact in an original sentencing proceeding.
4
These findings affect the length or severity of the sentence a judge im-
poses, permitting either an increase or decrease in the recommended base
sentence. 15 Sentence modification proceedings are substantively differ-
ent, because they only allow for a downward departure from the original
sentence.
This Comment argues that the Tenth Circuit came to the correct de-
cision in holding that Booker does not apply to sentence modification
proceedings--effectively eliminating any discretion for federal sentenc-
ing judges to impose a sentence that departs from the Guidelines in mod-
ification proceedings. Part I of this comment outlines the history of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines to provide an appropriate background to
analyze the subsequent cases. Part II discusses the Supreme Court's se-
minal decision in United States v. Booker. Part I discusses the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Hicks and the Tenth Circuit's opin-
ions in United States v. Rhodes and United States v. Pedrazza. These
cases illuminate the distinct approaches taken by the two circuits as to
whether the Supreme Court's decision in Booker does or does not apply
to sentence modification proceedings. Finally, Part IV analyzes the
strengths and weaknesses of the Ninth and Tenth Circuit's differing ap-
proaches. Part IV concludes that the Tenth Circuit's holding more accu-
rately captures the intent of Congress and the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion when promulgating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, while also
refraining from infringing on defendants' Sixth Amendment rights.
10. See id.
11. United States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 730 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that "[a] motion
pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) 'is not a do-over of an original sentencing proceeding'); United States v.
Cothran, 106 F.3d 1560, 1562 (1 1th Cir. 1997) (holding that "§ 3582(c)(2) ... doles] not contem-
plate a full de novo resentencing"); see also United States v. McBride, 283 F.3d 612, 615 (3rd Cir.
2002) (holding that § 3582(c)(2) does not constitute a full resentencing).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006).
13. Id. § 3553(a).
14. See United States v. Rhodes, 549 F.3d 833, 840 (10th Cir. 2008).
15. See id.
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I. HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
In order to understand the implications of the decision in Rhodes
and the preceding decision in Booker, a cursory understanding of the
history of the Guidelines and the role they have played in criminal sen-
tencing is necessary. The Guidelines were created in 1987, and shortly
after their introduction, they became a mandatory and binding set of rules
for federal judges. 16 Throughout the history of American jurisprudence,
however, the concept of a mandatory sentencing scheme was never a de
facto assumption. In fact, the opposite was true. Prior to 1987, judges
were granted wide discretion in determining individual sentences be-
cause the philosophical underpinnings of punishment focused on the
rehabilitation of offenders. 17 As a result, courts focused on individually
tailored sentences designed to best assist each prisoner's rehabilitation.'
8
When the ideologies surrounding the purposes of punishment
changed, however, a change in the nature of sentencing soon followed. 9
In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act ("SRA") in an at-
tempt to check the discretion of federal judges in sentencing proce-
dures.20 The SRA established the United States Sentencing Commission,
which in turn was charged with developing the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. 2' The Guidelines were passed in an effort "to enhance the
ability of the criminal justice system to combat crime through an effec-
tive, fair sentencing system. ' ,22 Three specific goals of implementation
were: "(1) 'honesty in sentencing'; (2) 'uniformity in sentencing by nar-
rowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed by different federal
courts for similar criminal conduct by similar offenders'; and (3) 'pro-
portionality in sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately
different sentences for criminal conduct of different severity.' ' 23 Other
provisions within the SRA effectively instituted the mandatory nature of
the Guidelines.24
The Guidelines were designed to be structured and formulaic.25
These characteristics are pertinent to the SRA's goals of honesty, uni-
formity, and proportionality, and they enable even-handed and methodi-
16. Jelani Jefferson Exum, The More Things Change: A Psychological Case Against Allowing
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Stay the Same in Light of Gall, Kimbrough, and New Under-
standings of Reasonableness Review, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 115, 118 (2008).
17. Daniel M. Levy, Defending Demaree: The Ex Post Facto Clause's Lack of Control Over
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Booker, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2623, 2630 (2009).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2630-31.
20. Exum, supra note 16, at 118.
21. Levy, supra note 17, at 2630-31.
22. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I AI.1 (2007).
23. Exum, supra note 16, at 118 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IAI.1
(2007)).
24. Levy, supra note 17, at 2632; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2006).
25. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I B 1.1 (2007).
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cal application of the rules to rein in judicial discretion.26 When applying
the federal sentencing rules, judges must follow a nine-step process in
determining the appropriate sentence. 27 This process consists of: (1) de-
termining the offense guideline applicable to the convicted offense; (2)
determining the base offense level; (3) adjusting the base offense level
by taking into account, among other considerations, the defendant's role
in the offense or obstruction of justice; (4) repeating the previous steps
for each convicted offense; (5) adjusting the base offense level for accep-
tance of responsibility; (6) determining the defendant's criminal history
category; (7) determining the applicable guideline range that corresponds
to both criminal history category and base offense level; (8) determining
what options are available as regards probation, imprisonment, fines,
supervision condition, and restitution for the applicable guideline range;
and (9) consulting any policy statements, commentary, or language with-
28in the Guidelines that might influence the sentence to be given.
Shortly after their introduction, the Guidelines had the "force of
law." 29 However, this notion proved to be transitory, as the mandatory
Guidelines would ultimately be declared unconstitutional in 2005 by the
Supreme Court's decision in Booker.
30
H. THE ROAD FROM BOOKER TO RHODES
The United States Supreme Court declared the Guidelines were ad-
visory-not mandatory-in United States v. Booker.31 This decision was
the impetus for the question presented in the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Rhodes, and will be discussed below at length. Following an explanation
of the precedent established in Booker, this Comment discusses the dif-
fering approaches to applying Booker to sentence modification proceed-
ings taken in United States v. Hicks,32 United States v. Rhodes,3 3 and
United States v. Pedraza.34 The Comment concludes with an analysis of
the two disparate methods, and argues the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in
Rhodes is more sound.
A. Booker Background
Appearing in the Western District of Wisconsin, Booker was
charged with intent to distribute at least 50 grams of crack-cocaine. 35 The
26. See Exum, supra note 16, at 118.
27. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I B 1. 1 (a)-(i) (2007).
28. Id.
29. Levy, supra note 17, at 2632.
30. Exum, supra note 16, at 119-20.
31. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005).
32. 472 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2007).
33. 549 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 2008).
34. 550 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2008);
35. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
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jury found him guilty of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) 36 after hearing
evidence that he was in possession of 92.5 grams of crack-cocaine stored
in a duffel bag.37 At sentencing, the judge was required to take into con-
sideration the policies and mandates of the Federal Sentencing Commis-
sion.38 The judge determined that Booker's sentencing range fell between
210 and 262 months in prison, based on calculations that took into ac-
count the quantity of drugs the defendant was convicted of possessing
and the defendant's prior criminal history.39 In an act that would serve as
the impetus for the appeal, the judge made additional findings of fact by
a preponderance of the evidence, which enabled him to increase the de-
fendant's sentencing range.4° Under the new calculation, the judge de-
termined that the defendant's sentencing range now fell between 360
months and life imprisonment. The judge sentenced Booker to thirty
years (360 months) in prison, and Booker appealed.4'
B. The Booker Majority Opinions
The threshold question presented in Booker was whether the manda-
tory application of the Guidelines violated a defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment fight to "a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. ''42 In an-
swering this inquiry, the Supreme Court first looked to its holding in
Apprendi v. New Jersey.43 In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that "any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."44 Based on this precedent, the Booker Court held that, because
the district court judge increased Booker's sentence based upon findings
not submitted to a jury nor proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the sen-
tence violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.45
The Court briefly discussed the history and theory behind sentenc-
ing policy, noting that explicit and definitive sentencing procedures had
long been criticized-generally with pleas for broad judicial discretion.
46
Pursuant to the Federal Guidelines, judges were now called upon to im-
36. The statutory language: "(a) Unlawful acts: Except as authorized by this subchapter, it
shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally- (I) to manufacture, distribute, or dis-
pense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2006).
37. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
38. Id.
39. Id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D1.1(c)(4) & 4AI.1 (2003).
40. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227. The judge individually determined in the post-trial hearing that
the defendant Booker was guilty of distributing 566 grams of crack-cocaine (instead of the 92.5
grams determined by the jury) and obstructing justice. Id.
41. Id.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Booker, 543 U.S. at 229 n.l.
43. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
44. Id. at 490. The statutory maximum is defined as the "maximum sentence a judge may
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004).
45. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 227.
46. Id. at 236.
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pose sentence enhancements upon statutory minimums with judicial find-
ings that analyzed the defendant's conduct.47 Provisions for individual-
ized enhancement and tailoring of sentencing ranges "reflected growing
... legislative concern about the proliferation and variety of drug
crimes.""8 Yet, in Booker, the Court expressed its concern that this de-
velopment was increasingly taking the power away from the jury, and in
turn placing that power in the hands of individual public servants-
federal judges.49
The Booker Court penned a total of five opinions in its decision, in-
cluding two majority opinions each receiving a 5-4 vote. Delivering the
opinion of the Court in part, Justice Stevens wrote that the Guidelines are
subject to the jury trial requirements of the Sixth Amendment. 50 Building
on the holding in Apprendi, Justice Stevens amplified the Court's posi-
tion that "[a]ny fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to
support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts estab-
lished by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defen-
dant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt." 5' As a result of this
holding, the prior practice of increasing a defendant's sentence beyond
the standard range, based upon independent judicial findings, was
deemed unconstitutional.52
Justice Breyer delivered the remedial majority opinion and was
forced to reconcile several competing interests: the Guidelines' institu-
tional hold on the bench and bar, congressional and judicial desire to
maintain uniformity and fairness in sentencing, and the newly unconsti-
tutional status of a mandatory Guideline system.53 Justice Breyer focused
on congressional intent and asked what "Congress would have intended
in light of the Court's constitutional holding., 54 The majority elected to
sever and excise two provisions of the 1984 Sentencing Act because
"engraft[ing] the Court's constitutional requirement onto the sentencing
statutes . . . would destroy the system. 55 Eliminating provisions 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) and § 3742(e) eradicates the mandatory nature of the
Guidelines in original sentencing, but still requires judges to consider the
Guidelines and other sentencing goals contained within the 1984 Sen-
tencing Act.56 As a result, the Guidelines continue to provide some uni-
formity and predictability in sentencing, but at the same time, they equip
47. See id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 237.
50. Exum, supra note 16, at 120.
5. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005).
52. Id. at 245.
53. Id. at 244-45.
54. Id. at 246 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id. at 252.
56. Id. at 259; see also 18 U.S.C. §3553(a) (2003).
776 [Vol. 87:3
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judges with the discretion to impose an increased sentence within the
statutory range.
Booker solidifies a defendant's constitutional right to have a jury es-
tablish, beyond a reasonable doubt, any fact that serves to increase a sen-
tence. However, Justice Breyer's proposed remedy creates a paradox in
itself. By excising the two provisions, federal sentencing judges are no
longer required to impose a sentence dictated by the Guidelines, yet they
are not prohibited from making additional findings of fact without the
aid of the jury when sentencing defendants. Justice Stevens's majority
opinion states that the constitutional issue raised would have been
avoided if the Guidelines were advisory.58 The problem confronted in
Booker was whether the judicial fact-finding that served to increase a
defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum was unconstitu-
tional, but the remedy is simply more judicial discretion. "[W]hen a trial
judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a de-
fined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the
facts that the judge deems relevant., 59 Judges continue to make findings
that serve to increase a defendant's sentence, so long as that discretion
and fact finding effects a term within the customary range.
III. DOES BOOKER APPLY TO SENTENCE MODIFICATION PROCEEDINGS?
While the Booker Court made clear that mandatory sentencing
guidelines were unconstitutional in original sentencing proceedings, the
decision did not reach sentence modification proceedings. The Ninth
Circuit was the first court to address the effect of Booker on sentence
modification proceedings. The Tenth Circuit was next in line to address
the issue and came to an opposite conclusion, creating a split with its
sister circuit. Since that time, eight of the nine remaining circuit courts
have confronted the issue, and all have followed the rationale put forth
by the Tenth Circuit. These decisions strengthen the Tenth Circuit's jus-
tification for creating a split with the Ninth Circuit, but the divergent
view of the Ninth still remains unreconciled with the majority.
A. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation in United States v. Hicks
1. Hicks Background
In a matter of first impression, the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Hicks overturned the district court's decision and held that Booker ap-
plied to sentence modification proceeding under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2). 60 The facts in Hicks are very similar to those in Booker.
The defendant was convicted for conspiring to distribute crack-cocaine,
57. Booker, 543 U.S. at 246.
58. Id. at 233.
59. Id.
60. United States v. Hicks, 472 F.3d 1167, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007).
2010]
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enabling drug trafficking, and carrying a firearm in connection with the
underlying crimes. 61 The court analyzed the offenses under the Guide-
lines and imposed a sentence of 420 months in prison.
62
However, this sentence was not the final word for Hicks. On No-
vember 1, 2000, the U.S. Sentencing Commission promulgated Amend-
ment 599, which eliminated any sentence enhancement for possessing,
brandishing, using, or discharging an explosive or firearm in conjunction
with the underlying offense.63 This amendment applied directly to
Hicks's case, because the judge had considered Hicks's use of a firearm
in connection with the underlying offenses to increase his sentence over
the statutory maximum. 64 Under the new amendment, Hicks's two-point
enhancement for possession of a firearm while trafficking drugs was no
longer valid.65
Interestingly, Hicks moved to modify his sentence based on
Amendment 599 after the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Book-
er. 6 6 The defendant argued that the court should apply Booker to
§ 3582(c)(2) resentencing proceedings, which would allow judicial dis-
cretion to impose a sentence below the range set forth in the Federal
Guidelines.67 The district court rejected this argument, but that ruling
would change on appeal.68
2. Hicks and the Applicability of Booker to § 3582(c)( 2 ) in the
Ninth Circuit
Modification of a sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) allows for a
downward adjustment if the Federal Sentencing Commission alters rele-
vant Guidelines. 69 The question that naturally followed was whether the
modified range adopted by the Sentencing Commission is mandatory or
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C (2000) ("If a sentence under this guide-
line is imposed in conjunction with a sentence for an underlying offense, do not apply any specific
offense characteristic for possession, brandishing, use, or discharge of an explosive or firearm when
determining the sentence for the underlying offense. A sentence under this guideline accounts for
any explosive or weapon enhancement for the underlying offense of conviction, including any such
enhancement that would apply based on conduct for which the defendant is accountable under
§ I B 1.3"); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K2.4, cmt. n.2 (2000).
64. Hicks, 472 F.3d at 1168.
65. Id. at 1169.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1168-69.
69. Id. at 1170. Pertinent statutory language:
The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except that
... (2) in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment
based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon motion of the defendant ... the court
may reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section
3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with appli-
cable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2006).
[Vol. 87:3
UNITED STATES V. RHODES
advisory in Booker's wake. In Hicks, the Ninth Circuit held that Booker
rendered the Guidelines advisory in every context, which by default
would include sentence modification proceedings.7°
After finding that the factors specified in § 3553(a) justify a modifi-
cation of the sentence, 71 a court must also ensure a modification would
be consistent with any applicable policies of the Federal Sentencing
Commission.72 However, as the Booker holding is a constitutional rule,
the court clarified that the applicability of the Booker holding to sentence
modification would ultimately trump any policy statement should an
inconsistency arise between the tWo. 7 3 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit
continued its policy analysis to see if it could find common ground be-
tween the two.
The policy set forth in § 1B1.10(b) of the Guidelines reads: "In de-
termining . . . a reduction in the term of imprisonment . . . the court
should consider the term of imprisonment that it would have imposed
had the amendment(s) to the guidelines listed in subsection (c) been in
effect at the time the defendant was sentenced." 7 The Ninth Circuit's
decision reconciles this language with its ultimate conclusion that Booker
applies to modification proceedings through its interpretation of the word
"should." As the language of § 1B1.10(b) is not mandatory, the court
reasoned that in a sentence modification proceeding the judge is not
bound by the sentence he would have imposed had the amendment been
in effect at the time, but should feel free to go below the applicable
guideline.75
B. The Tenth Circuit Weighs in with United States v. Rhodes
1. Rhodes Background
On December 5, 2008, the Tenth Circuit weighed in with its inter-
pretation of whether Booker applied to sentence modification proceed-
70. Hicks, 472 F.3d at 1172.
71. The pertinent statutory language reads:
(a) Factors To Be Considered in Imposing a Sentence.
The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply
with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining
the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider (I) the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sen-
tence imposed ... ; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the
sentencing range established ... ; (5) any pertinent policy statement ... ; (6) the need to
avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any vic-
tims of the offense.
18 U.S.C. 3553(a) (2006).
72. Hicks, 472 F.3d at 1172.
73. Id.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Id.
2010]
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ings pursuant to § 3582(c)(2).76 The posture of the case was similar to
both Booker and Hicks in that the appeal came before the court for a
modified sentence after the Sentencing Commission amended the Guide-
lines.77 Here, the defendant Theomas Rhodes was convicted and sen-
78tenced for his involvement in a conspiracy to distribute crack-cocaine.
Similar to Hicks, this sentence modification occurred in the new post-
Booker ambit of sentencing, and therefore the defendant requested that
the sentencing judge consider the new modified sentencing range as ad-
visory, rather than mandatory.
79
When determining the initial sentence, the district court analyzed
the various metrics and ranges imposed by the Guidelines (pre-Booker)
and found Rhodes's sentencing range to fall between 210 to 262 months,
finally sentencing him to 210 months in prison.80 However, just as the
defendant in Hicks requested a sentence modification based on Amend-
ment 599, Rhodes sought a § 3582(c)(2) modification pursuant to
Amendments 706, 712, and 713. 8' Amendment 706 granted a two-level
reduction from the base offense for crack-cocaine offenses, and 712 and
713 allowed the 706 Amendment to apply retroactively.82 The combina-
tion of these amendments resulted in a potential lowering of Rhodes's
sentence. 83 In a pro se motion, Rhodes asked the judge to impose a sen-
tence at the low end of the new range, which was lowered by amendment
706, because his original sentence had been at the low end of the sen-
tencing range imposed before the amendment. 84 However, after the court
appointed counsel for Rhodes, the motion was modified.85 Rhodes then
asked that the court impose a sentence of 168 months or less, with 168
months being the lowest minimum sentence available under the modified
sentencing guidelines. 86 The defendant based this request on considera-
tion of his exemplary post-conviction behavior and personal initiative to
obtain an education while incarcerated.87 Ultimately the judge sentenced
Rhodes to 168 months in prison, which was the lowest possible sentence
that remained within the Federal Guidelines' range.
88
76. United States v. Rhodes, 549 F.3d 833, 841 (10th Cir. 2008).
77. Id. at 834.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 836.





85. Id. at 836.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 837.
780 [Vol. 87:3
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2. The Rhodes Appeal
In rendering the sentence, the judge indicated that he was required
to "go back to what [he] would have given him, had [the current sentenc-
ing guidelines] been in effect then," indicating that post-conviction be-
havior was irrelevant to the process.89 On appeal, Rhodes questioned the
validity of this ruling.90 He also appealed the district court's holding that
"it lacked the authority to impose a sentence below the amended guide-
line range.
9 1
In analyzing the question presented, the Tenth Circuit looked to the
policy statement in § I B 1.10 issued by the Sentencing Commission-just
as the Ninth Circuit had done in Hicks-because any sentence modifica-
tion pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) must satisfy both the § 3553(a) factors and
applicable policy statements. 92 However, in the interim between the deci-
sion in Hicks and the appeal in Rhodes, the Sentencing Commission al-
tered some of the language of § 1B1.10, limiting judicial discretion on
sentence modification proceedings.93 In pertinent part, policy statement
§ IBI.10 reads as follows:
(2) Limitations and Prohibition on Extent of Reduction.
(A) In General.
Except as provided in subdivision (B), the court shall not reduce the
defendant's term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and
this policy statement to a term that is less than the minimum of the
amended guideline range determined under subdivision (1) of this
subsection.
94
On appeal, Rhodes argued § lBI.10 construed the Guidelines as
mandatory, an outcome that would conflict with the holding in Booker.
95
The Court quickly dismissed this argument, finding that proceedings
pursuant to § 3852 do not constitute full resentencings. 96 Thus, the Court
rejected the Ninth Circuit's antecedent analysis in Hicks.97
The Tenth Circuit's argument can be broken down into two steps.
First, Booker only applies to original sentencing proceedings, because
the Sixth Amendment concerns that rendered the Guidelines advisory are
not implicated in situations involving sentence modification.98 Second,
89. Id. at 836.
90. Id. at 834.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 840.
93. United States v. Pedraza, 550 F.3d 1218, 1221 (10th Cir. 2008).
94. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IB 1.10(b)(2)(A) (2008).
95. Rhodes, 549 F.3d at 839.
96. Id. at 839-40.
97. Id. at 841.
98. Id. at 839-40.
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sentence modification proceedings are distinguished from original sen-
tence proceedings because different statutes govern them.99
Original sentencing proceedings are guided by 18 U.S.C. § 3553,
and require the court to make numerous determinations based on the
parameters set forth in the Sentencing Guidelines.' °° However, a modifi-
cation proceeding is "a different animal," as it is much more limited in
scope.' 0' In a sentence modification pursuant to § 3582(c)(2), if a court
decides to revise a sentence, the only permissible action is a decrease in
term. 0 2 A judge has no authority to increase the sentence after it has
been imposed. 0 3 The judge does not make additional findings of fact to
increase the defendant's sentence, which was the main Sixth Amendment
concern rectified by the Booker decision.1' 4 In Booker, the Court only
excised the part of the statute that made the Guidelines mandatory in
original sentencing proceedings-the Supreme Court was silent on how
the Federal Guidelines would apply to sentence modifications.10 5 Ulti-
mately, Rhodes reinforced the continuing mandatory nature of the Guide-
lines when conducting a sentence modification proceeding in the Tenth
Circuit.
C. The Tenth Circuit Remains Consistent in Pedraza
1. Pedraza Background
Less than one month after Rhodes, the Tenth Circuit was presented
with a similar situation in the case of defendant Enrique Pedraza.' °6 Pe-
draza was convicted and sentenced in a drug smuggling conspiracy in-
volving transportation of 700 kilograms of cocaine from Columbia to the
United States. 107 Under the Guidelines, Pedraza's baseline offense level
was 40, resulting in an initial sentence of 384 months.10 8 Approximately
two and a half years after Pedraza was sentenced, the Sentencing Com-
mission passed Amendment 505, which limited the upper level for all
drug sentences to 38 (applied retroactively via Amendment 536). 1°9 This
new Amendment would decrease Pedraza's sentence from a range of 360
months to life, to 292 months to 365 months."0 The district court judge
99. Id. at 840.
100. Id.
101. United States v. Torres, 99 F.3d 360, 362 (10th Cir. 1996).
102. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(b)-(c) (2006).
103. See id.
104. Rhodes, 549 F.3d at 840.
105. Id.
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imposed a sentence of 292 months, the lowest sentence possible under
the guidelines."''
2. Pedraza Majority
Like Rhodes, Pedraza appealed his sentence. Pedraza claimed that
the Guidelines were only advisory after Booker, and the judge had dis-
cretion to further decrease the sentence." 12 The court rejected this argu-
ment, citing its holding in Rhodes and explaining that Booker does not
apply to sentence modification proceedings pursuant to § 3582(c)(2)
because sentence modifications are a separate process, distinct from ini-
tial sentencing.
113
The court was also required to determine if § 3582(c)(2), in and of
itself, vested judges with the discretion to grant variances below the rec-
ommended guideline range on sentence modifications. Although the
court definitively held that Booker was inapplicable in sentence modifi-
cations, it recognized that a "judge's resentencing authority is a creation
of statute."' 14 Therefore, if § 3582(c)(2) authorized a judge's discretion
to impose below Guidelines modifications, it would be valid. 1 5 The Sen-
tencing Commission is the entity that determines the scope of a judge's
authority under § 3582(c)(2)-a power vested in the Commission by
statute.1 6 To determine the extent of the judge's power in sentence modi-
fications, the court needed to analyze the Commission's applicable pol-
icy statement § IBI.10.117
Although Rhodes's appeal was decided first, Pedraza's initial resen-
tencing proceeding occurred eight months before Rhodes's initial resen-
tencing." 8 In the interim between these two hearings, the Sentencing
Commission changed the policy language of § IB1.10.119 In pertinent
part, the policy as applied to Pedraza, stated that "the court should con-
sider the term of imprisonment that it would have imposed had the
amendment(s) to the guidelines listed in subsection (c) been in effect at
the time the defendant was sentenced."'120 This language does not indicate
that a sentence modification should be treated in the same manner as an
initial sentencing.' 21 Therefore, the majority found the amended language
to be consistent with its holding in Rhodes and followed its precedent






117. Id. at 1221.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I B 1.10(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
121. Pedraza, 550 F.3d at 1221.
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holding that Booker did not apply to sentence modification proceedings
pursuant to § 3582(c)(2).
22
3. Pedraza Dissent
In an opinion that afforded the court's "learned colleagues on the
Ninth Circuit" a great amount of deference, the dissent focused on the
change in policy language of § I B 1.10(b)(2) between Pedraza and Rho-
des.123 Although § 1B1.10 did not specifically articulate that a sentence
modification was equivalent to an initial sentencing, the dissenting judge
preferred to invoke the "rule of lenity" in Pedraza's situation. 24 This rule
of judicial construction provides that when ambiguity exists in a criminal
statute relating to prohibition and penalties, such ambiguities are re-
solved in favor of the defendant when not contrary to legislative intent. 125
Because § 1B 1.10 does not explicitly address the question presented, the
dissent would choose to allow for modification below the recommended
guidelines and follow the precedent of the Ninth Circuit by applying the
rule of lenity.
26
IV. WHY THE TENTH CIRCUIT GOT IT RIGHT
A. Weaknesses of the Ninth Circuit Interpretation in Hicks
In justifying its holding in Hicks, the Ninth Circuit asserted that
"Booker abolished the mandatory application of the Sentencing Guide-
lines in all contexts."'' 27 This oversimplifies the issue. The catalyst behind
the Booker decision was the Sixth Amendment concern that arose when
federal judges increased sentences beyond the standard range based upon
judicial fact finding. 28 Although this was common practice in sentencing
procedures at the time, Booker held the practice to be unconstitutional.
29
These same concerns do not arise in the context of a sentence modi-
fication proceeding. First and foremost, a sentence modification proceed-
ing can only lower an individual's sentence; it cannot enhance a sen-
tence. In Apprendi, and consequently in Booker, the United States Su-
preme Court was concerned only with a "fact that increases the penalty
for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum," as the Sixth
Amendment requires such facts must be submitted to the jury and proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.130 The individual protections contained with-
in the Sixth Amendment do not apply to situations where the government
122. Id. at 1222.
123. Id. (McKay, J., dissenting).
124. Id.
125. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1 3 59 (8 ed. 2004).
126. Pedraza, 550 F.3d at 1223 (McKay, J., dissenting).
127. United States v. Hicks, 472 F.3d 1167, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007).
128. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 229 n.1 (2005).
129. See id. at 244.
130. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (emphasis added).
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does not erode an individual's liberty, but in fact only decreases a per-
son's sentencing exposure, as is the case in sentence modification pro-
ceedings.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit construes sentence modification pro-
cedures to be the equivalent of an initial sentencing procedure. 3' Yet,
even as it advanced this argument the court recognized that a sentence
modification truly is a different procedure, by conceding that a resen-
tencing is "limited in certain respects."' 32 The most critical difference is
that a modification does not call into question the Sixth Amendment
concern that was the underpinning of the Booker decision. It is impossi-
ble in such a proceeding for judicial fact finding to increase a defendant's
sentence.
Congress created the U.S. Sentencing Commission with the intent
that the Commission would create a set of guidelines to regulate sentenc-
ing procedures to ensure consistency and fairness in sentencing.133
Throughout the decision in Booker, the Supreme Court consistently reit-
erated that Congress intended to create a mandatory sentencing scheme,
despite the ultimate holding that federal district judges are no longer
bound by the ranges prescribed by the guidelines in original sentencing
proceedings. 1
34
To determine the Commission's intent, the Hicks court looked to the
policy language set forth in § 1B1.10 because § 3582(c)(2) allows for a
sentence modification only after consulting the § 3553(a) factors and
complying with existing policy statements.' 35 The court reasoned the
policy statements do not address the threshold question of whether the
Booker holding is applicable to sentence modification proceedings,
which is foreseeable as the statements were published before the Court
decided Booker.'36 The Ninth Circuit concluded the language of the pol-
icy statement does not prohibit the application of the Guidelines in sen-
tence modifications in an advisory manner.'
37
It is true that the policy language is not explicit on this point, failing
to give either an affirmative or negative answer. However, considering
the totality of the circumstances, it seems evident that Congress and the
U.S. Sentencing Commission intended to create a mandatory and binding
set of guidelines.' 38 It is clear that this is no longer possible in the context
of initial sentencing, but in a modification procedure, where the Booker
Sixth Amendment concern is not present, courts would do well to look
131. Hicks, 472 F.3d at 1171.
132. Id.
133. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I A 1.3 (2000).
134. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 passim (2005).
135. Hicks, 472 F.3d at 1172.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I A 1.3 (2000).
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back to the original purpose and legislative intent underlying the Guide-
lines. Justice Breyer's majority opinion in Booker concludes that Con-
gress and the Commission would have desired that the Guidelines be
stripped of their mandatory nature in the least invasive way possible. 39 If
the mandatory nature of the Guidelines fails to raise any constitutional
concerns in the context of modification, there is no reason to render them
advisory.
B. The Tenth Circuit Breaks Rank in Rhodes
First in Rhodes and then in Pedraza, the Tenth Circuit had two dis-
tinct opportunities to decide whether the Guidelines were mandatory or
advisory as applied to sentence modification proceedings. The Tenth
Circuit was fortunate to decide Rhodes prior to Pedraza. This sequencing
proved fortuitous because the U.S Sentencing Commission revised its
policy language in the wake of the Hicks decision in order to directly
address the issue presented in that case. 14° Now, § IB1.10 specifically
states that the court shall not reduce the defendant's term of imprison-
ment, pursuant to § 3582(c)(2), to a length that is less than the minimum
of the amended guideline range. 14 Originally, the Ninth Circuit relied on
the textual ambiguity to reconcile the text with the seemingly inconsis-
tent holding that Booker applied to sentence modification. The change in
§ 1Bl.10's policy language evidenced the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion's intent to maintain mandatory guidelines during sentence modifica-
tion. The Tenth Circuit correctly retained the binding nature of the
Guidelines in sentence modification proceedings by concluding that
Booker does not apply in the modification context and thus complying
with newly amended policy language.
Soon after the decision in Rhodes, the court decided Pedraza. 142 Pe-
draza's resentencing occurred before the change in policy language that
was discussed in Rhodes. As a result, the same § 1 B 1.10 policy language
that applied in Hicks governed Pedraza's sentencing modification.143 The
Tenth Circuit, however, did not retreat to the rationale of the Ninth Cir-
cuit. Rather, the Court looked at § 1 B 1. 1 O's application notes, the Guide-
lines as a whole, and the legislature's intent in creating guidelines, to
conclude that § 3582(c)(2) and the "applicable commentary strongly
suggest that the resentencing judge's discretion extends to substituting
the new guideline range for the old guideline range but goes no fur-
ther."' 4
139. Booker, 543 U.S. at 265.
140. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § I B 1.1 0(b)(I) (2008).
141. Id. § IB1.10(b)(2)(A).
142. United States v. Pedraza, 550 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2008).
143. Id. at 1221.
144. Id.
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Sentence modifications can only lower a defendant's sentence. The
concerns giving rise to Booker's constitutional rule are not present in
modification proceedings. Furthermore, the Commission's change in
policy language solidifies its intent that § 3582(c)(2), in and of itself,
does not authorize an advisory Guideline scheme in the context of modi-
fication. Rather, the Guidelines should retain their mandatory status.
In the time since the Tenth Circuit decided Rhodes and Pedraza,
eight circuits-the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth
and Eleventh-have addressed the issue of whether Booker applies to
sentence modification proceedings.145 In all instances, the circuit courts
correctly held that Booker does not affect § 3582(c)(2) modification pro-
ceedings. 146 Thus, while the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Hicks remains at
odds with the decisions in other circuits, the current trend clearly sup-
ports the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Rhodes and Pedraza. Although the
Guidelines lost some of their bite after Booker, the decision in Rhodes
reinstates their importance in maintaining a system of federal criminal
sentencing that is fair, consistent, and uniformly applied.
CONCLUSION
While the merits of greater judicial discretion or bright line sentenc-
ing rules can be debated, the U.S. Sentencing Commission, authorized by
Congress, has determined that mandatory guidelines are preferable. Al-
though no longer mandatory in initial proceedings, the Guidelines con-
tinue to exert significant influence on initial sentencing and have proven
to retain their binding authority in the majority of Circuits addressing the
Guidelines' role in sentence modification proceedings. Even if applied in
an advisory manner, the Guidelines will continue to influence federal
judges in sentencing procedures, but will do so without infringing on
defendants' Sixth Amendment rights.
While the Tenth Circuit was the first court to create a split with the
Ninth Circuit on this issue, recent decisions in other circuits have coa-
lesced behind the rationale of Rhodes.147 Whether the Supreme Court
will grant certiorari to unify the circuits remains to be seen. As it stands
now, however, the circuit split directly undermines the Sentencing
Commission's goals of consistency, honesty, and fairness in sentencing,
as the Guidelines are not being applied uniformly across the circuits.
145. See United States v. Fanfan, 558 F.3d 105, 106 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Savoy,
567 F.3d 71, 72 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 307 (3d Cir. 2009); United
States v. Dunphy, 551 F.3d 247, 250 (4th Cir. 2009); United States v. Doublin, 572 F.3d 235, 238
(5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Cunningham, 554 F.3d 703, 704 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Starks, 551 F.3d 839, 840-41 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Melvin, 556 F.3d 1190, 1190 (11 th
Cir. 2009).
146. See Fanfan, 558 F.3d at 106; Savoy, 567 F.3d at 73; Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 314; Dunphy, 551
F.3d at 252; Doublin, 572 F.3d at 238; Cunningham, 554 F.3d 703, 709; Starks, 551 F.3d at 842-43;
Melvin, 556 F.3d at 1190.
147. See, e.g., Starks, 551 F.3d at 842-43; Dunphy, 551 F.3d at 252.
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Whether through Supreme Court action or through a change in the Ninth
Circuit's position on the issue, one thing remains clear: the resulting in-
consistency in sentence modifications requires prompt resolution.
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